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I.  INTRODUCTION 
The centuries-old dispute between Argentina and Great Britain regarding 
the ownership of the Falkland Islands (known as “Las Malvinas,” in 
Spanish), escalated to an undeclared war when, on April 2, 1982, Argentina 
invaded and occupied the Falkland’s capital city of Port Stanley.1  Professor 
Lawrence Freedman, a preeminent scholar on the Falkland Islands War, 
argued that it was difficult, at least initially, to “take the conflict seriously” 
because of the very nature of the Islands themselves, which he described as 
“an inaccessible and inclement part of the South Atlantic”2 and lacking any 
“great strategic and economic asset.”3  The Falkland Islands are composed of 
two large islands, East and West Falkland, as well as approximately 200 
smaller islands, all of which cover a total area of a little more than 4,600 
square miles.4  The Falklands consist of Dependencies, including South 
Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands.5  The physical terrain of the 
Falkland Islands is primarily made up of hilly grasslands, and the Falklands’ 
economy is mainly based on sheep herding.6  A 1980 census estimated the 
Islands’ population at approximately 1,800 people, total.7 
The territorial dispute between Argentina and Great Britain dates back to 
the eighteenth century, at which point the Islands were viewed by the 
European colonial powers “as a key access point to the southern straits and 
Cape Horn.”8  France was the first to colonize East Falkland, but eventually 
withdrew after protest and compensation from Spain, who took control of the 
Island in 1767.9  The British took possession of West Falkland, and its 
neighboring islands in the mid-1760s.10  Although Spanish armed forces 
                                                                                                                   
 1 Lawrence Freedman, The War of the Falkland Islands, 1982, 61 FOREIGN AFF. 196, 196–
97 (1982). 
 2 Id. at 197. 
 3 Id. at 200. 
 4 United Nations General Assembly, Special Committee on the Situation With Regard to 
the Implementation of the Declaration of the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries 
and Peoples, Working Paper Prepared by the Secretariat, at 1, U.N. Doc. No. A/AC.109/670 
(Aug. 5, 1981), in RAPHAEL PERL, THE FALKLAND ISLANDS DISPUTE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 
AND POLITICS 404 (1983) [hereinafter UN Working Paper]. 
 5 Id. 
 6 Freedman, supra note 1, at 197. 
 7 UN Working Paper, supra note 4, at 1.    
 8 Jorge O. Laucirica, Lessons From Failure: The Falklands/Malvinas Conflict, 1 SETON 
HALL J. DIPL. & INT’L REL. 79, 80 (2000). 
 9 Id.  Professor Metford points out that during this timeframe, “the Spaniards claimed 
dominion over all South America, except for the parts occupied by the Portuguese.”  J.C.J. 
Metford, Falklands or Malvinas? The Background to the Dispute, 44 INT’L AFF. 463, 467 
(1968). 
 10 Metford, supra note 9, at 467. 
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expelled the British from the territory in 1770,11 the Spaniards “handed over” 
the settlement to Britain a year later.12  Britain’s occupation of West Falkland 
was shortlived, however, and it withdrew its naval garrison from the Island 
within a few years.13  Upon its departure, the British left a plaque stating its 
claim to the territory: “ ‘In witness whereof this plate is set up, and his 
Britannic Majesty’s colours left flying as a mark of possession.’ ”14  
Regardless of Britain’s claim, Spain occupied the Island after the British 
withdrawal.15  In the early 1800s, as Spanish rule in Latin America came to 
an end, the Government of Buenos Aires for the United Provinces, which 
would eventually become Argentina, occupied the Falklands, and claimed 
sovereignty over them in 1829.16  In 1833, Britain reclaimed the Islands 
through the use of force and maintained a presence thereon after.17  
According to Professor Freedman, “Argentina never forgave Britain for this 
reoccupation,” and in 1945, the Argentine government “revived its claim” to 
the Islands.18   
In 1965, the United Nations addressed the territorial dispute through the 
adoption of U.N. Resolution 2065.19  The resolution urged that the Falkland 
Islands dispute be resolved in accordance with U.N. Resolution 1514, which 
espoused the right of self-determination for colonial countries and peoples,20 
and that Argentina and Britain proceed in negotiations “without delay” in 
order to find a “peaceful solution to the problem.”21  However, over the next 
seventeen years, there was essentially no diplomatic progress.22  Instead, the 
two countries were involved in a series of military provocations, which 
ultimately were the backdrop to war.  Professor Freedman notes that by 
1982, Argentina’s “patience had run out with Britain” and “[t]he 150th 
                                                                                                                   
 11 Id. 
 12 Id. at 468.  
 13 Id.  
 14 Id. 
 15 Freedman, supra note 1, at 197.  
 16 Id. 
 17 Id.; see also Metford, supra note 9, at 475–76 (detailing the expulsion). 
 18 Freedman, supra note 1, at 197. 
 19 Question of the Falkland Islands (Malvinas), G.A. Res. 2065 (XX), U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/2065(XX) (Dec. 16, 1965) [hereinafter Resolution 2065]. 
 20 Id.; Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, 
G.A. Res. 1514 (XV), U.N. Doc. A/RES/1514(XV) (Dec. 14, 1960). 
 21 Resolution 2065, supra note 19, para. 1. 
 22 In 1973, the U.N. General Assembly indicated that it is “[g]ravely concerned at the fact 
that eight years have elapsed since the adoption of resolution 2065 (XX) without any 
substantial progress having been made in the negotiations.”  Question of the Falkland Islands 
(Malvinas), G.A. Res. 3160 (XXVIII), U.N. Doc. A/RES/3160 (XXVIII) (Dec. 14, 1973).   
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anniversary in January 1983 of the British seizure of the islands appeared as 
a sort of deadline.”23   
On March 19, 1982, Argentine scrap metal merchants landed on South 
Georgia Island and planted the Argentine flag on the British dependency.24  
Britain had a relatively “muted” response to the incident, and dispatched 
approximately half its marine garrison from the Falklands to South 
Georgia.25  This event served as an appropriate distraction and catalyst for 
the upcoming Argentine invasion.  On April 2, at the direction of President 
Leopoldo Galtieri, Argentine forces successfully invaded and occupied the 
Falkland Islands.26  After diplomatic negotiations failed to bring the crisis to 
an end, Great Britain and Argentina engaged in what has been described as a 
“limited war,” which lasted approximately ten weeks.27  As a result of the 
war, 255 British and 652 Argentine soldiers died.28  In the end, Argentina 
surrendered, and Great Britain repossessed the Islands.29   
This Article focuses on examining why Argentina’s military junta 
violated fundamental principles of international law30 and waged a war of 
aggression,31 and what processes could have deterred this armed conflict.  
Some scholars have claimed that the Argentine government initiated this war 
in order to deflect attention away from its stagnant domestic economy and its 
inhumane social policies.32  However, these broad characterizations and 
motivations do not give adequate weight to the complexity of the 
decisionmaking process associated with international relations, and do not 
assist in determining which policies may have deterred the conflict.  The 
                                                                                                                   
 23 Freedman, supra note 1, at 198.    
 24 Id. at 199; see also LORD FRANKS, THE FALKLAND ISLANDS REVIEW, REPORT OF A 
COMMITTEE OF PRIVY COUNSELLORS 49–50 (1983) [hereinafter FRANKS REPORT] (detailing 
events leading up to the planting of the flag). 
 25 Freedman, supra note 1, at 199.   
 26 See id. at 199 (“With its [n]avy at sea and only two days away from the islands, the 
temptation for the Argentine government to take the historic step . . . seemed irresistible.”). 
 27 Id. at 196.  Professor Freedman stated that the Falkland Islands War was “limited in time, 
in location, in objectives, and in means.”  Id. 
 28 MAX HASTINGS & SIMON JENKINS, THE BATTLE FOR THE FALKLANDS 316 (1983).  
Although the Argentine government announced their casualties as 652, the exact number has 
never been verified.  Id. 
 29 Freedman, supra note 1, at 196. 
 30 See U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4 (“All Members shall refrain in their international relations 
from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any 
state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.”).  
 31 Freedman, supra note 1, at 200 (describing Argentina’s attack on the Falklands as “a 
clear act of aggression and a disregard of the principle of peaceful settlement of international 
disputes”). 
 32 John Arquilla & Maria Moyano Rasmussen, The Origins of the South Atlantic War, 33 J. 
LATIN AM. STUD. 739, 740 (2011). 
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Falkland Islands War provides an illuminating case study for examining the 
effectiveness of multi-leveled deterrence because the war itself has been very 
well documented by historians, and the events leading up to the conflict 
involve several instances in which the British government could have 
implemented alternative policies. 
The following sections will put forth an analysis regarding Argentina’s 
pre-war decisionmaking process, including an investigation into the behavior 
and influence of senior-level Argentine officials during the crisis, as well as 
an examination of Argentina’s domestic political structure and the 
international system in general.  Based on this evidence, I will discuss what 
multi-level domestic and international mechanisms were unavailable—or 
were available but simply failed—in deterring the use of force in these 
circumstances.  By providing a cursory examination of the events leading up 
to the Falkland Islands War, this Article will emphasize significant themes 
associated with the pre-war planning in Buenos Aires, and, in doing so, 
provide a framework for determining what policies can be employed in order 
to avoid future armed conflicts.  Part II provides a brief overview of Kenneth 
Waltz’s work, Man, the State, and War: A Theoretical Analysis,33 which 
summarizes the most prominent international relations theories on the 
causation of war, and Part III analyzes these complex factors in relation to 
the Falklands War.  Part IV discusses the significance of multi-level 
deterrence in international relations, and how these factors either failed, or 
were nonexistent in the Falklands War context.  Part V provides some brief 
concluding thoughts. 
II.  BACKGROUND: INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND THE DECISIONMAKING 
PROCESS  
In his groundbreaking work, Man, the State, and War, Kenneth Waltz 
reviews both historic and modern approaches to understanding the causes of 
international armed conflict.  Waltz argues that scholarship in this area has 
produced three “images” of international relations that describe the 
underlying reasons for war: (1) human nature; (2) a State’s internal structure; 
and (3) the international system, all of which must be examined in concert in 
order to fully comprehend war and bring about peace.34  The following 
section elaborates on Waltz’s analysis, and incorporates additional theories 
related to the causation of war, which in their totality, will be applied to the 
Falklands War context. 
                                                                                                                   
 33 KENNETH N. WALTZ, MAN, THE STATE, AND WAR (1959). 
 34 Id. at 12. 
478   GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L.  [Vol. 40:473 
 
A.  Human Nature, Regime Elites, and the Decisionmaking Process  
Waltz’s first image depicts human nature as a fundamental cause of war.  
Accordingly, “[w]ars result from selfishness, from misdirected aggressive 
impulses, [and] from stupidity,” and “the elimination of war must come 
through uplifting and enlightening men or securing their psychic-social 
readjustment.”35  Waltz reviews the debate between the so-called “optimists” 
and “pessimists” on whether war can actually be eliminated through the 
alteration of the nature and behavior of man.36  Generally speaking, the 
former believes a peaceful world is feasible because man is capable of 
changing his “moral-intellectual outlook” or his “psychic-social behavior,” 
and the latter presumes that war is inextricably linked to man’s evil and 
destructive nature, which ultimately cannot be altered through reason or 
education.37 
Recently, scholars have tried to expand upon this first image in their 
explanation of the decisionmaking process during times of crisis.  For 
example, in Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis, 
political scientists and established practitioners Graham Allison and Philip 
Zelikow provide their own three-part analysis of the decisionmaking 
process.38  Allison and Graham indicate that, in addition to reviewing the 
nature and behavior of man in general (as Waltz describes), analysis of the 
decisionmaking process needs to take into account the different political 
motivations, strategies, and goals of the regime elites who are managing a 
country’s national security apparatus.39  As Allison and Zelikow explain, 
regime leaders are not a monolithic group, but instead, individual “player[s] 
in a central, competitive game.  The name of the game is politics: bargaining 
along regular circuits among players positioned hierarchically within the 
government.”40  Therefore, in order to understand government behavior, one 
needs to understand the interactions and competing preferences of the 
different regime elites who are influencing the final decisions or outcomes.41   
                                                                                                                   
 35 Id. at 16. 
 36 Id. at 18–19. 
 37 Id.  
 38 GRAHAM ALLISON & PHILIP ZELIKOW, ESSENCE OF DECISION: EXPLAINING THE CUBAN 
MISSILE CRISIS (2d ed. 1999).  Allison and Zelikow discuss three “models” as being essential 
to understanding the decisionmaking process: Model I, the Rational Actor; Model II, 
Organization Behavior; and, Model III, the Government Politics Mode.  Id. 
 39 Id. at 255–324. 
 40 Id. at 255.   
 41 Id.   
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B.  Internal State Structure 
Waltz’s second image focuses on the internal structure of nation-states as 
the driving force behind understanding international conflict.  Waltz provides 
examples of the “internal defects” in a nation-state that may lead to armed 
aggression, such as: the existence of a “generically bad” type of 
government,42 the restrictions and limitations placed on governments that 
hinder effective and peaceful foreign policy,43 and the inherent geographic or 
economic deprivations that lead to aggressive and expansive claims for 
resources.44  Accordingly, if one can eliminate these internal defects from 
governments in order to create “good” nation-states, as opposed to 
“generically bad” nation-states, then international peace may be achieved.45  
However, as Waltz demonstrates, the competing definitions of internal 
defects and good governance ultimately depend on one’s own political, 
social, or economic outlook.46  Thus, although followers of both Karl Marx 
and Immanuel Kant, for instance, may agree that reform at the nation-state 
level is a prerequisite to peace, each group may have radically different 
perceptions on how to bring about this change.47 
Deviating somewhat from Waltz, it is this Article’s contention that there 
is sound empirical evidence proving that a democratic form of government 
will have a tremendous impact on whether a nation-state engages in armed 
aggression.  The Democratic Peace Theory (DPT), which argues that major 
wars48 are rarely, if ever, fought between well-established democracies, has 
“achieved broad support across the political spectrum.”49  For instance, in 
studying the 353 total occurrences of war between 1816 and 1991, DPT-
advocate Professor R.J. Rummel concluded that “[n]ever has there been a 
war involving violent military action between stable democracies.”50  
                                                                                                                   
 42 WALTZ, supra note 33, at 82.  In describing a “generically bad” form of government, 
Waltz states that “the deprivations imposed by despots upon their subjects produce tensions 
that may find expression in foreign adventure.”  Id. 
 43 Id. 
 44 Id. at 82–83. 
 45 Id. at 83. 
 46 See id. at 83–84 (detailing how the views of Karl Marx, Woodrow Wilson, and Immanuel 
Kant all differed because of their ideologies). 
 47 Id. at 83.  According to Waltz, Karl Marx would define a “good” nation-state “in terms of 
ownership and means of production,” while Immanuel Kant would base such a definition “in 
terms of abstract principles of right.”  Id. 
 48 For Democratic Peace Theory (DPT) purposes, a “major war” is defined as “interstate 
war with over one thousand casualties.”  John Norton Moore, Beyond the Democratic Peace: 
Solving the War Puzzle, 44 VA. J. INT’L L. 341, 342 (2004). 
 49 Id. (footnote omitted).  
 50 RUDOLPH J. RUMMEL, DEATH BY GOVERNMENT 2 (1994). 
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However, 155 of these wars were fought between democracies and non-
democracies, and the other 198 wars were fought solely between non-
democratic nation-states.51  Professor Rummel has also provided statistical 
data illustrating that non-democratic governments murder their own 
populations at an exceedingly higher rate than democracies.52  According to 
Professor Rummel, in the twentieth century, there have been approximately 
170 million accounts of “democide,”53 and non-democratic states are 
responsible for more than eighty percent of these deaths.54  Professor John 
Norton Moore posits that “most [scholars] now accept that the [DPT] is one 
of the most important correlations found to date about the nature of war.”55 
Scholars have proffered several different rationales and explanations in 
support of the DPT.56  In “Three Pillars of the Liberal Peace,” Michael W. 
Doyle succinctly argues that the DPT can best be understood by examining 
three interrelated factors that are institutionally present in democracies: 
republican representation, an inherent ideological respect for human rights 
and values, and transnational interdependence.57  First, in democratic forms 
of government, regime leaders tend to be held accountable to the state and 
the voters.58  Democracies, therefore, “preclude monarchs or dictators 
turning their potentially aggressive interests into public policy while 
assuming that the costs will be borne by a subordinate public.”59  By holding 
free and fair elections, democracies permit both the rotation of regime elites 
and the reversal of unpopular policies.60  Additionally, Doyle cites 
                                                                                                                   
 51 Id. 
 52 Id. at 1–9. 
 53 Id. at 15.  Rummel defines democide as the “murder of any person or people by a 
government, including genocide, politicide, and mass murder.”  Id. at 31. 
 54 Id. at 20. 
 55 Moore, supra note 48, at 344–45. 
 56 See, e.g., BRUCE RUSSETT, GRASPING THE DEMOCRATIC PEACE: PRINCIPLES FOR A POST-
COLD WAR WORLD (1993) (clarifying the theoretical debate and producing additional support 
for the relative pacifism of democracies); see generally BRUCE RUSSETT & JOHN O’NEAL, 
TRIANGULATING PEACE (2001) (arguing that democracy, economic interdependence, and 
international mediation can successfully cooperate to significantly reduce the chances of war); 
Michael Doyle, Liberalism and World Politics, 80 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1151 (1986) (outlining 
the logic of how states that were both liberal and representative remain peaceful with one 
another, but not reliably with nonliberal, nonrepresentative states); IMMANUEL KANT, 
PERPETUAL PEACE (1795) (providing the foundation for DPT arguing that a majority of the 
people would not vote to go to war, unless in self-defense). 
 57 Michael W. Doyle, Three Pillars of the Liberal Peace, 99 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 463, 463 
(2005). 
 58 Id. at 464. 
 59 Id. 
 60 Id.; see also John Norton Moore, A New Paradigm in International Relations: A 
Reduction of War and Terror in the World through Democratization and Deterrence, 17 
TRANSNAT’L L. 83, 84 (2004) (stating that “In democracies there is a system of checks and 
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legislatures and public opinion as important drivers that restrain government 
leaders from enacting policies contrary to fundamental interests of the 
general citizenry.61  On this issue, Doyle also notes that democracies are 
more “transparent” than alternative forms of government, which ensures that 
the internal decisionmaking process is exposed internationally, and foreign 
counterparts treat such outcomes or decisions with a higher degree of 
credibility.62   
Next, because democratic governments respect fundamental human rights 
domestically, there is a belief that their foreign counterparts will do the same, 
which, in effect, creates a sense of trust and cooperation between 
democracies.63  On the other hand, because democratic states perceive non-
democracies as having aggressive policies towards their own constituency, 
they presume such governments would incorporate similar policies in their 
foreign relations.64  Doyle notes, “fellow liberals benefit from a presumption 
of amity; nonliberals suffer from a presumption of enmity.”65    
Lastly, Doyle connects the development of transnational interdependence 
to a peaceful predisposition between democratic states.66  Accordingly, the 
desire for economic prosperity creates incentives for governments to promote 
peace and avoid war.67  “Liberal economic theory,” according to Doyle, 
“holds that these cosmopolitan ties derive from a cooperative international 
division of labor and free trade according to comparative advantage when the 
parties can expect to be governed by a rule of law that respects property and 
that enforces legitimate exchanges.”68  Thus, nation-states increase prosperity 
                                                                                                                   
balances.  For example, in a democratic system leaders are not chosen by violence, but rather, 
they are chosen for their ability to appeal to a mass audience.  This process is in sharp contrast 
with non-democratic systems. . . .”). 
 61 Doyle, supra note 57, at 464. 
 62 Id. 
 63 Id. 
 64 Id.; see also Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe: Document of the 
Copenhagen Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension, June 29, 1990, 29 I.L.M. 
1305 (discussing the link between democracy, rule of law, and the respect for human rights).  
 65 Doyle, supra note 57, at 464. 
 66 Id. at 464–65. 
 67 Id. at 465. 
 68 Id. at 464–65.  In addition to citing the factors listed in Doyle’s work, Professor Moore 
argues that the “most important” factor in understanding the DPT, is “public choice theory.”  
Moore, supra note 60, at 84–85.  According to Professor Moore, “[n]on-democratic leaders 
have almost unfettered ability to internalize all the benefits of international aggression while 
externalizing the cost of potential harm upon their populations.  Thus, non-democratic leaders 
are far more disposed to high-risk aggressive actions risking major war and other disasters.”  
Id. at 85.  See James M. Buchanan, Politics Without Romance: A Sketch of Positive Public 
Choice Theory and Its Normative Implications, in THE THEORY OF PUBLIC CHOICE–II, at 11–
22 (James M. Buchanan & Robert D. Tollison eds., 1984) (detailing the implications for 
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through international cooperation, as opposed to autarky, which is a 
significant factor underscoring peaceful foreign relations.69  Additionally, 
“[t]he interdependence of commerce and the international contacts of state 
officials help create cross-cutting transnational ties that serve as lobbies for 
mutual accommodation. . . . [I]nternational financiers and transnational and 
transgovernmental organizations create interests in favor of 
accommodation.”70  On the other hand, the suspicions between democratic 
and non-democratic states may limit their social and economic interactions.71  
This background with regard to the DPT is important in the understanding of 
the Falkland Islands War because, as discussed in more detail below, the 
Argentine authoritarian government structure had a significant impact on the 
decisionmaking process prior to the conflict. 
C.  The International System 
Waltz’s third image evaluates the anarchic international system as a cause 
for war.  Waltz summarizes this view of international relations as follows: 
“[w]ith many sovereign states, with no system of law enforceable among 
them, with each state judging its grievances and ambitions according to the 
dictates of its own reason or desire—conflict, sometimes leading to war, is 
bound to occur.”72  Given the anarchic system in which we exist, a nation-
state may use force at any time to achieve its goals simply because there is 
no authority preventing such aggression.  Thus, in the absence of any 
overarching authority, and based on the presumption that nation-states have 
competing interests, policies, and goals, every nation-state must constantly 
be prepared to defend its national interests, by force if necessary.73  This 
ultimately, can itself be a cause of war.74  Although some have argued that 
the creation of world government may make armed conflict based on image 
                                                                                                                   
public choice theory in politics). 
 69 Doyle, supra note 57, at 465. 
 70 Id.  Doyle notes that 
because keeping open markets rests on an assumption that the next set of 
transactions will also be determined by prices rather than coercion, a sense of 
mutual security is vital . . . . Thus, avoiding a challenge to another liberal 
state’s security or even enhancing each other’s security . . . naturally follows 
economic interdependence. 
Id. 
 71 Id. Doyle also argues, “[w]hen property lacks clear title and exchanges are subject to 
manipulation and uncertain legal enforcement — the typical environment of non-liberal states 
— then economic contact generates strife.”  Id. 
 72 WALTZ, supra note 33, at 159. 
 73 Id. 
 74 Id. 
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three obsolete, Waltz dismisses this solution as “unassailable in 
logic . . . [and] unattainable in practice.”75 
III.  ANALYSIS: THE FALKLAND ISLANDS WAR 
By focusing on all three of Waltz’s images, as well as recent scholarship 
in this area, one is able to see the complexity associated with understanding 
the underlying reasons motivating a nation-state to wage a war of aggression.  
The following analysis will examine all of these factors in the context of the 
Falkland Islands War.  In doing so, I will attempt to provide a framework for 
understanding why the Argentine government used its armed forces as a 
means for obtaining its goals, and what factors, if any, could have deterred 
the use of force in this situation.  Thus, the next section will examine the 
thinking and strategy among the key individuals of the Argentine regime 
who instigated the Falkland Islands War, the Argentine government structure 
and its impact on the decisionmaking process leading to this conflict, and, 
lastly, the anarchic international system. 
A.  Argentina: Regime-Elite Decisionmaking 
By examining the decisionmaking process of Argentina’s political and 
military leaders, including President and Army Commandant Galtieri, Navy 
Commandant Admiral Jorge Anaya, and Air Force Commandant Brigadier 
General Arturo Lami Dozo, and other key regime elites during the lead-up to 
the Falkland Islands War, one can see that the conflict was as much about 
personal and political opportunism as it was about ideology.  The 
development of Argentina’s war strategy has its roots in the 1970s, almost 
immediately after the military junta gained control of the government.  The 
1976 coup d’état in Argentina resulted in Lieutenant General Jorge Rafael 
Videla assuming the presidency, while his ambitious political opponent 
Admiral Emilio Massera remained the navy commandant.76  In an attempt to 
undermine Videla, Massera “delivered a formal request to the junta for a 
military force in order to proceed to recover the Falkland Islands.”77  Videla 
understood that the request amounted to nothing more than a political ploy, 
and thus the president responded by both recognizing the importance of 
reclaiming the Falklands and demanding that a thorough military strategy be 
                                                                                                                   
 75 Id. at 238. 
 76 OSCAR RAÚL CARDOSO ET AL., FALKLANDS: THE SECRET PLOT 2–4 (Bernard Ethell trans., 
1987). 
 77 Id. at 4. 
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completed before Massera’s request would be granted.78  Consequently, 
Massera assigned the responsibility for developing a Falkland war strategy to 
his subordinate Jorge Anaya, who completed his mission in 1977.79   
Although Massera did not follow up with his request to the junta for 
military assets, Anaya turned the development and implementation of this 
military strategy “into a personal quest.”80  Anaya believed that the 
Argentine navy could use the Falkland Islands as a southern base to control 
the Cape Horn shipping region while still remaining at a safe distance from 
its rival Chile.81  Anaya thought the recovery of the Falklands was crucial to 
the navy and the future of Argentina in general, and he viewed the two as 
“inextricably and irrevocably linked.”82  Anaya has been described as “the 
one man [in the Argentine government] who was undoubtedly most single-
minded in his determination to recapture the Malvinas, and who was most 
disposed to use force to do it.”83  United States Secretary of State Alexander 
Haig recalled a discussion with Admiral Anaya, in which the commandant 
said “[m]y son is ready to die for the Malvinas[ ] and it is my family’s point 
of view that we would be proud to know his blood mingled with this sacred 
soil.”84  More recently, in recognition of his death in 2008, commentators 
described Anaya as the “leading proponent”85 and the “driving force”86 
behind the Argentine invasion of the Falkland Islands.  Anaya’s personal 
position on this matter is significant because of the key role he played in 
ensuring that Galtieri obtained the presidency in the 1981 coup.   
In Falklands: The Secret Plot, Oscar Raul Cardoso presents a detailed 
timeline regarding both Anaya’s strategy to invade the Falkland Islands and 
Galtieri’s rise to the presidency.87  According to Cardoso, Galtieri and Anaya 
were “close friend[s]” and often attempted to leverage the political upheavals 
in Argentina during the era for their own political advantages.88  For 
instance, Cardoso describes that in the 1980s, both men schemed to 
overthrow then-President Roberto Eduardo Viola from power,89 while Anaya 
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simultaneously argued that reclaiming the Falklands would have tremendous 
domestic political benefits for the junta, and that Galtieri was “the 
man . . . needed” to lead Argentina’s political-military establishment.90  
Regarding Anaya’s former argument—domestic politics—both he and 
Galtieri perceived Argentina’s recent economic stagnation and social unrest 
as a threat to the government, and both “believed . . . that it was 
necessary . . . to revitalise the military machine which was showing 
unmistakable . . . exhaustion.”91  After being in power for five years, the 
Junta’s economic programs led to a “crisis affecting all orders of society.”92  
The government’s fiscal policies resulted in a spike in civil and commercial 
bankruptcies, high unemployment in key labor sectors, and soaring external 
debt.93  In this environment, Galtieri considered success in the Falklands as a 
“shortcut to popularity.”94 
Given that Galtieri has been described as a man who was “seduced by the 
idea of power,”95 and, during his time as president, as someone who 
developed “Messianic aspirations,”96 he agreed with Anaya’s proposition 
that he should lead the country to the forefront of the international stage.  
Eventually, Galtieri and Anaya agreed to an “unwritten pact” in which the 
latter agreed to support Galtieri’s coup for the presidency, and the former 
agreed to support the military strategy to reclaim the Falkland Islands.97  On 
December 22, 1981, with the backing of the commandant of the navy and 
(the soon to be) commandant of the air force, Admiral Anaya and Brigadier 
General Lami Dozo respectively, Galtieri successfully forced the resignation 
of Argentine President Viola and was officially named president of 
Argentina.98   
                                                                                                                   
note 81, at 61. 
 90 CARDOSO ET AL., supra note 76, at 6. 
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 93 Id. at 64–70. 
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(“Within Argentina, recovery of the ‘Malvinas’ would not stifle internal dissent, but at least it 
would unite the nation for a time.  It would serve as a vindication of military rule and cleanse 
the reputation of the armed forces after the horrors of the dirty war . . . .”). 
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Galtieri and Anaya informed Lami Dozo about the decision to recapture 
the Falkland Islands on December 29, 1981, within a week of Galtieri 
obtaining the Presidency.  Cardoso described this event as follows: 
[Galtieri, Anaya, and Lami Dozo] made small talk until Anaya 
and Galtieri threw the Falklands idea on the table.  Inside 
twelve months, they said, one hundred and fifty years of British 
occupation of the archipelago would be completed.  The 
Government of the armed forces had to try to ensure that by 
that time the blue and white flag would fly over Port Stanley.99 
When Anaya and Galtieri finished discussing their proposal, Lami Dozo did 
not raise any objections, and instead “accepted” the decision.100  Lami Dozo 
was “far less belligerent” than the others, and agreed to the mission because, 
for him, the recovery of the Islands “made sound political sense.”101  The air 
force commandant believed that a victory in the Falklands would salvage the 
military’s political reputation, which was in decline due to both failing 
economic and oppressive social policies.102   
The war strategy was buttressed by the fact that Great Britain, and the 
international community in general, failed to put forth a strategy that would 
have deterred an Argentine act of aggression.  The junta thought that Britain 
and its allies would treat a “bloodless” invasion and occupation of the 
Falklands as fait accompli, and limit any response to nonmilitary and 
nonviolent terms.103  Galtieri is even on record as stating: “I’ll tell 
you . . . that though an English [military] reaction [to an Argentine invasion 
of the Falklands] was considered a possibility, we did not see it as a 
probability.  Personally, I judged it scarcely possible and totally 
improbable.”104  Scholars also contend that a segment of the Argentine 
government was confident that its military would have a reasonable chance 
                                                                                                                   
 99 Id. at 26. 
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of winning an armed conflict against Britain in the event that London did 
respond to an invasion with the use of force.105  Some in the junta apparently 
believed “that there was little or nothing in a military sense that Britain could 
do to dislodge Argentina from the Falklands once they had actually occupied 
it,” and that a British amphibious counterattack had “little chance of 
success.”106 
Based on this analysis, one is left with the view that the three most 
powerful Argentine regime leaders all agreed, without any significant dissent 
or hesitation, that instigating a war in the Falkland Islands would be a 
national priority.  President Galtieri believed that a successful invasion of the 
Falklands would help solidify his control of the government and the country; 
Admiral Anaya thought a military victory in the Falklands would be a sort of 
vindication for the years he spent planning for the war; and Brigadier 
General Lami Dozo viewed the war as a prerequisite for the maintenance of 
the Junta’s power structure.107   
The regime leaders mandated that their war strategy be withheld from 
dissemination, and in fact, very few Argentineans knew of the mission.108  In 
March 1982, weeks prior to the actual invasion, only a select group of 
Argentine officials outside the military commandants knew about the 
planning, including the Argentine commander of naval operations, Vice-
Admiral Juan Jose Lombardo, the foreign minister, Costa Mendez, and the 
chief of operations of the army general staff, Brigadier General Mario 
Benjamin Menendez.109  However, a cursory review of the roles these men 
played in the planning and lead-up to the Falklands invasion illustrates the 
near-uniform manner in which they accepted and supported the mission, and 
where there was dissent, the swiftness with which the dissension was 
silenced. 
Lombardo was one of the first men to be informed of the Falkland Islands 
war plot when, on December 15, 1981, he was summoned to meet with his 
supervisor Admiral Anaya.110  Cardoso describes the exchange as follows: 
“I order you,” said Anaya, resorting to a formula that left no 
margin for error, “to prepare a plan for an Argentine landing in 
                                                                                                                   
 105 See generally Arquilla & Rasmussen, supra note 32 (arguing that “[a] fast decreasing gap 
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the Falkland Islands.  You are to be the first to know about this.  
It would be wise, therefore, for the people you choose to work 
on the plan to keep their mouths shut. Secrecy is vital.  Do you 
understand me?”111 
According to Cardoso, Lombardo challenged his supervisor by asking an 
obvious question, “admiral — what is going to happen after we’ve taken the 
islands?”112  Anaya had a “cutting reply” for Lombardo: “[d]on’t you worry 
about that, because that’s not your responsibility . . . . Limit yourself to 
working on the plan to take the islands; the rest can come later.”113  In 
Cardoso’s scholarship, he does not identify any significant moment in which 
Lombardo challenges the regime elites on the basis that their action was the 
equivalent to a war of aggression.  Rather, he obeyed orders in drafting a war 
strategy, as requested by the commandant of his branch of armed service.114 
Similarly, Costa Mendez, who was serving as the Galtieri’s foreign 
minister, did not strenuously object to the junta’s decision to reclaim the 
Falklands.115  In February 1982, Galtieri informed Costa Mendez of the war 
strategy, and, in response, the latter “proposed that a working party should be 
formed to study and develop possible alternative[s].”116  However, Galtieri 
denied this proposal and demanded that the war strategy be developed with 
absolute secrecy.117  On March 26, 1982, the military junta requested that 
Costa Mendez join them to discuss the military strategy, and, when Costa 
Mendez arrived, the junta informed him that the decision had been made to 
invade the Falklands in a matter of days.118  According to one account, Costa 
Mendez “encouraged the military decision, egging the commandants on by 
saying: ‘Let’s do it now!’ ”119  Costa Mendez’s is also important to this 
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analysis because, “[a]t no point” during the Falklands War strategy 
development, did “Costa Mendez or any of his advisers appear to have 
believed a British military response was likely,” which served to support the 
regime elite’s disposition.120  According to the Foreign Minister: 
[I]n the diplomatic circumstance the peaceful and bloodless 
occupation of the islands would make the Argentine will to 
negotiate the solution of the underlying conflict evident.  This 
occupation would make it possible for us to negotiate once and 
for all the underlying dispute.  It would also induce the 
international community, the interested parties and even the 
United States of America to pay more attention to the reasons 
for the dispute, its character and the need for a rapid solution.  
The United Nations would not be able to procrastinate if faced 
with a military action and would have to discuss it at the 
highest possible levels.121 
Menendez, who was chosen to be military governor of the Falklands after 
the invasion, challenged, at least to some degree, the regime elites regarding 
the war policy.  On March 2, 1982, President Galtieri told Menendez, “[w]e 
have taken the decision to recover the Falklands by military means and the 
Junta have approved my proposal that you should head the military 
government of the islands.”122  Menendez listened in astonishment as Galtieri 
discussed the details of the plans, and when Galtieri completed his remarks, 
Menendez responded: “What do you think will be the British reaction after 
we recover the islands?”123  Similarly to Anaya’s response to Lombardo’s 
request for more details on the post-war strategy, Galtieri told Menendez, 
“[t]hat is not your problem,” and, “just concern yourself with preparing to 
govern.”124  According to Cardoso, Menendez left the meeting without 
knowing “whether to jump for joy or ask the earth to . . . swallow him.  He 
had many doubts . . . but Galtieri’s assurance about the success of this 
                                                                                                                   
of the war decision, Costa Mendez limited himself to urging for quick action so as to preclude 
an attempt by the British to fortify the islands.  Id. 
 120 HASTINGS & JENKINS, supra note 28, at 48–49. 
 121 FREEDMAN & GAMBA-STONEHOUSE, supra note 114, at 81.   
 122 CARDOSO ET AL., supra note 76, at 52. 
 123 Id. at 53. 
 124 Id.  During an interview after the Falkland Islands War, Menendez stated, “When General 
Galtieri said to me: ‘If this operation goes ahead, you will become governor,’ I could have said 
no.  But I said yes.  Faced with this a soldier will say to himself: I stay and do my duty, or I go.  I 
stayed.”  Fight for The Falklands: Twenty Years On, BBC, http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/stat 
ic/in_depth/uk/2002/falklands/my_story/menendez.stm (last visited Feb. 6, 2012). 
490   GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L.  [Vol. 40:473 
 
operation calmed him.”125  Two days later, Menendez approached the chief 
of the army general staff, Jose Antonio Vaquero, and told him that his 
previous discussion with Galtieri “left [him] worried.”126  Vaquero tried to 
convince Menendez of the logic behind the war strategy by stating that the 
British government has had “this [Falkland] problem for a long time . . . . 
The fact is they are going to shout a lot, get annoyed and appear tough, to 
satisfy internal public opinion . . . England doesn’t know what to do with the 
Falklands.  They find them expensive and far away.  Those 1800 inhabitants 
give them endless trouble.”127   
Menendez was not satisfied with Vaquero’s rationale.128  Instead, the 
following week, Menendez spoke openly to Galtieri about his concerns: 
“[w]hat are going to be the direct or indirect consequences that Argentina 
will suffer after the military action?”129  According to Cardoso, Galtieri 
mandated that Menendez not concern himself with these issues because they 
had already been resolved within the military, in coordination with the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Menendez should “[c]oncentrate on being 
the Military Governor.”130  It was at this juncture that “Menendez stopped 
worrying,” and replied, “That’s clear enough, Sir.  I shall think no more 
about it.  I will think simply in the terms of a Military Governor.”131 
This cursory review of key regime leaders illustrates how the junta sought 
unanimity in its war policy development and the secret manner in which it 
operated.  Given the fact that the plot to invade the Falklands came from the 
most senior levels of government, any dissention could be viewed as 
insubordination which helped ensure that lower level officials carried out 
their orders.  This approach helped cause or reinforce the most important 
misperception held by the junta: that the British government or international 
community would not respond with force to an Argentine invasion.  
According to one scholar: 
Reports from foreign agents and correspondents generally 
enabled Buenos Aires to buildup a relatively glowing picture of 
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how the world saw the new Argentina. . . . Much of [the 
intelligence] came through military channels and was liable to 
the distortion inherent in military lines of command.  Officers 
were conscious that evidence of minimal response was what 
their superiors wanted to hear.  Yet everything pointed to the 
same conclusion: the British would not respond militarily; the 
Third World countries at the UN would side with Argentina; 
there would be insufficient support for a vote favourable to 
Britain in the Security Council; even if there were sufficient 
support, Russia would honour the anti-colonialist ticket and 
veto it; any sanctions imposed by Britain would be ineffective 
and short-lived.132 
The manner in which the regime leaders discussed war strategy seemed to 
discourage opposing viewpoint, and silenced dissention.  This is important to 
note because when foreign governments and international organizations are 
developing strategies to deter acts of aggression from dictatorships, they 
must focus on the key regime elites driving the overarching policy, as 
opposed to the lower rank-and-file soldiers—or the general public for that 
matter—who may not have an opportunity to challenge the bellicose 
planning of their own government. 
B.  The Argentine Internal Government Structure 
As seen above in the description of Waltz’s image-two analysis, as well 
as the DPT, a government’s form and configuration may have a profound 
effect on its international relations.  An understanding of the Argentine 
military junta’s organizational structure, its rise to power, and its horrific 
domestic oppression provides valuable insight into its pre-war 
decisionmaking process.  In 1970s Argentina, the socialist-leaning 
“Montoneros” conducted guerilla warfare across the country targeting 
several different sectors of society, including monetary, law enforcement, 
and labor centers and personnel.133  In response to the violence, the 
Argentine government, led by Juan Perόn, and his delegate Héctor Cámpora, 
granted amnesty to the Montoneros and other extremist groups, which 
“effectively legitimized” their existence and consequently even permitted 
them to serve in the government.134  However, the uneasy reconciliation 
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between the leftists and the Argentine government was short-lived.  In 1973, 
Perόn rejected left-wing candidates for his government, and instead chose his 
third wife Isabel as his vice-president.135  In response, the Revolutionary 
Army of the People, the other main leftist guerrilla group in Argentina, 
attacked an army health services headquarters.136  Violence between the 
government and right-wing extremists on one hand, and the leftist guerrilla 
groups on the other, intensified from thereon after.137   
Argentine President Isabel Perόn, who succeeded her husband after his 
death in 1974, was ultimately unable to quell the violence, and, in November 
1974, issued a “state of siege” declaration, which permitted the government 
to suspend certain Constitutional rights.138  Four months later, Perόn signed a 
decree that ordered the army to conduct “whatever military operations may 
be necessary to neutralize or annihilate the action of the subversive elements 
acting in the province of Tucumán.”139  The order was soon after extended to 
cover the entire country.  During this timeframe the Argentine military 
portrayed the Perόn government as being institutionally incapable of 
resolving the underlying violence perpetrated by the leftist guerillas, and it 
sought to position itself as an acceptable government alternative.140 
On March 24, 1976, General Jorge Videla and the military Junta replaced 
Perόn’s civilian government through a coup.141  Given the state of violence 
in the country, many Argentineans actually welcomed Videla’s arrival.142  
The junta expanded upon Peron’s decrees and launched a “dirty war” against 
left-wing subversives and their sympathizers.143  According to Professor 
James McGuire, “[o]ne of the first acts of the military government led by 
General Jorge Videla was to unleash a campaign of terror unprecedented in 
modern Argentine history.”144  During the “dirty war,” “disappearances” 
were the junta’s preferred method of repression, and individuals who faced 
this form of punishment, generally speaking, may have been “murdered and 
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buried secretly, or often tortured, and then bound, drugged, and thrown from 
ships or aircraft into the Rio de la Plata.”145  Iain Guest, who has written 
extensively on the “dirty war,” describes the junta’s brutality during this era: 
“Never before had the resources of a state been geared to systematic torture 
and murder.  The Junta turned disappearances into a government policy and 
in so doing gave new meaning to the concept of state terror.  It was as 
deliberate, methodical, and calculated as collecting tax . . . .”146  Although 
there is no consensus on the “dirty war’s” death toll, according a government 
estimate, 13,000 people were killed or disappeared, and, according to a 
human rights group, approximately 30,000 people died or disappeared during 
this time frame.147 
The Argentine government was able to carry out these atrocities by 
consolidating legislative and judicial power within the executive branch.  For 
instance, the military junta enacted the State for the Process of National 
Reorganization, which in effect dissolved both federal and provincial 
legislative bodies, and permitted the arbitrary dismissal of senior-level 
government officials.148  According to Professors Banks and Carrio, during 
the “dirty war,” the junta enacted a series of statutes and decrees that 
“criminalized participation in political parties or labor strikes, publication of 
news concerning terrorism, subversion, or kidnappings and the discovery of 
bodies, criticism of official policies in university classrooms, and political 
acts that related to a political party.”149  The regime indicated that the 
“Constitution would remain in force only ‘to the extent that it does not 
oppose the main objectives set forth by the military junta or the provisions’ 
of its law.”150  With regard to the judiciary, the junta purged the supreme 
court, replaced approximately eighty percent of all federal judges, and 
required all new judges to swear an oath to the new constitutional order.151  
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Between 1976 and 1983, the Argentine government murdered or ensured the 
disappearance of hundreds of judges and attorneys.152   
Thus, by the time the junta was making the decision to launch a war of 
aggression in the Falklands in the 1980s, it was clearly operating under a 
dictatorship-style government, and in a manner that contradicts the 
abovementioned DPT ideals proposed by Professor Doyle.153  First, the 
Galtieri regime rose through a coup and retained power by consolidating 
almost all legislative and judicial control.154  Government officials did not 
have to prove themselves to a general electorate and were not held 
accountable to Argentine voters.  Instead, they were able to develop a 
Falklands war policy without any debate or input from constituents who 
would pay the majority of the costs.155  In fact, the Falkland Island War 
strategy was developed with the utmost secrecy, and not only was the general 
public shielded from this strategy, but fellow members of the Argentine 
government were unaware that these policies were being discussed.156  
Professors Arquilla and Rasmussen have also indicated that the military 
structure of the government hindered internal debate regarding the war 
strategy: 
That the military effectively ran the government, even to the 
extent of constraining decision making of members of the 
junta, fatally vitiated chances for peaceful settlement.  Just as 
important, perhaps was the chilling effect that the power of the 
Argentine [armed] services had on any meaningful debate of 
the decision to fight a major war.  Thus, a social norm of 
‘reticence’ on the part of the military officers to criticize war 
plans, or to call for more prudential behavior, was imposed, 
and may be a sign that the psychological phenomenon 
of . . . ‘groupthink’ was in play . . . .157  
Some scholars have even argued that military governments are more 
likely to develop “offensive”—leaning national security doctrines, as 
opposed to civilian controlled governments, because of their institutional 
composition.158 
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Next, the Argentine government clearly did not respect fundamental 
human rights and values.  It has been well documented that during the “dirty 
war,” the Argentine government committed grave atrocities and violated a 
wide range of human rights.159  Therefore, in accordance with Professor 
Doyle’s analysis, by creating aggressive and violent policies towards their 
own citizenry, one can easily comprehend that that the Argentine 
government would develop an aggressive foreign affairs policy.  Lastly, it 
should be noted that it was the junta’s brutal political and social 
oppressiveness that actually isolated Argentina’s interaction with the 
international community.160  For instance, “[t]he U.S. Administration under 
Jimmy Carter roundly condemned Argentina’s human rights record and 
brought in the Humphrey-Kennedy embargo on arms, which formally 
relegated Argentina to the status of a moral leper.”161   
C.  The International System, Self-Help, and the Argentine World View 
As briefly described above in Waltz’s “third image,” the concepts of 
anarchy and “self-help” in international relations greatly impact the decision 
on whether to use force and instigate an armed conflict.162  “A self-help 
system,” as Waltz describes, “is one in which those who do not help 
themselves, or who do so less effectively than others, will fail to prosper, 
will lay themselves open to dangers, will suffer.”163  The international system 
is anarchic, meaning that power is decentralized, and, although there are 
some universally accepted international laws and well-established 
international institutions, there is simply no world government to enforce 
laws or norms.164  Unlike the domestic realm, in which the nation-state can 
enforce the law or the status quo, in the global system there is no central 
governing authority to enforce existing international law or agreed upon 
international accords.  As Waltz notes, “[n]ational politics is the realm of 
authority, of administration, and of law.  International politics is the realm of 
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power, of struggle, and of accommodation. The international realm is 
preeminently a political one.”165  Therefore, nation-states must engage in 
self-help if they wish to survive.166 
In 1982, the Argentine government was pursuing a war strategy under the 
erroneous presumption that using force to reclaim the Falklands would not be 
met with a strong response by the British, or the United States, which was 
the regional superpower, or the international community in general.167  First, 
the Argentineans believed that, under the anarchic international system, the 
British would not implement a self-help policy employing armed forces to 
resolve the situation.168  As noted above, regime elites in Buenos Aires 
erroneously believed that a forceful yet bloodless invasion of the Islands 
would be acceptable to both the British and the international community.  
According to the Argentineans, London had neither the will nor the 
motivation to engage in an armed counterattack.169  The British government 
had conveyed to Argentina “no real interest in holding onto the islands,” and 
consequently, the Argentine government’s Falklands war strategy and 
foreign policy was premised on the miscalculation that the British would 
accept the Islands’ occupation as a fait accompli, and not respond with armed 
force.170 
Second, the Argentineans erroneously believed the United States would 
accept their claim to the Islands and act as a mediator between the Argentine 
and British governments to resolve the matter peacefully.171  It should be 
noted that the United States “professed neutrality” with regard to the 
Falklands dispute, and always abstained from voting on the matter at the 
United Nations.172  Also, during the 1980s, the Argentine government was 
actively seeking stronger bilateral relations with Washington, D.C.173  In fact, 
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during Galtieri’s tenure as president, the Argentineans were urgently trying 
to portray themselves to the Reagan Administration as a key ally in the 
United States’ fight against communism in the Western Hemisphere.174  As 
Professor Freedman notes, “[i]n Washington, the Galtieri regime was judged 
to represent the acceptable face of military dictatorship.  Cooperation 
[between the two countries] was developing on the support of other right-
wing regimes in Central America . . . . The hope was that Washington would 
not be too cross if Las Malvinas were retrieved . . . .”175 
In addition, Costa Mendez, the Argentine foreign minister, persuaded the 
junta that the United States would seek to find a peaceful resolution to the 
issue after the invasion, a concept referred to as the “super-power 
hypothesis.”176  The super-power hypothesis posited that in a bipolar world 
divided between the United States and the Soviet Union, the former would 
peacefully intervene in a Western Hemisphere-based crisis, dispute, or armed 
conflict in accordance with its Western super-power status, even if it 
embroiled a close ally, in order to maintain the status quo.177  The foundation 
for this hypothesis was based on historical events that had similar—but 
certainly not exact—characteristics to the Falkland crisis.  For example, in 
the Suez Crisis of 1956, Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser 
nationalized the Suez Canal, and the British and French, in coordination with 
the Israeli government, coordinated and implemented a military response.178  
The United States intervened in the conflict against its Cold War allies and 
attacked the Anglo-French-Israeli action to restore the status quo.179  In 
another example, during the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, Egypt and Syria initiated 
military hostilities against Israel, which resulted in a devastating armed 
conflict that lasted approximately three weeks.180  In response, the United 
States and the Soviet Union “agreed to try to bring the war to an end,”181 and 
Secretary of State Kissinger even pressured Israel not to destroy segments of 
Egyptian forces that it had surrounded in the Sinai desert.182  As a result of 
Egypt’s aggression and the armed conflict that followed, the Arab-Israeli 
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dispute became a “top-priority” for the United States.183  Costa Mendez also 
cited the United States’ role as a mediator in the El Salvador-Honduras and 
Ecuador-Peru disputes as evidence that Washington would attempt to find 
peaceful solutions to a regional conflict.184  However, as Cardoso aptly 
described, Mendez failed to recognize that the super-power hypothesis did 
not adequately explain the events unfolding in the Falklands because “the 
South Atlantic is remote and the Middle East was not.”185   
In addition to the United States’ previously-voiced neutrality on the 
territorial dispute, the improving Washington-Buenos Aires bilateral 
relations, and the super-power hypothesis, some have argued that the Reagan 
Administration directly indicated to the Argentineans that it would not 
attempt to prevent Argentina’s reclamation of the islands.186  This indication, 
if true, naturally played into the junta’s world view that its act of aggression 
would not be challenged militarily by the United States, and Great Britain, in 
the unlikely event it chose to do so, would be acting unilaterally with a 
military self-help response.  For instance, Tam Dalyell, a member of the 
British parliament during the Falklands War, alleges that Vernon Walters, an 
ex-Deputy Director in the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency and 
representative for the Reagan Administration, intermittently traveled to 
Buenos Aires in 1981 and 1982.187  It was during these visits in which 
Walters and senior members of the Argentine government discussed several 
national security-related issues, including the creation of a South Atlantic 
Treaty Organization, and the benefits a military base in the Falklands would 
have for such an organization.188  When the Argentineans asked how the 
British would respond to such an action, Walters “replied to the effect that 
the British would huff, puff and protest, and do nothing, with the implication 
that the American could soothe ruffled British feathers.”189  On a separate 
occasion, when Foreign Minister Costa Mendez attempted to ascertain from 
Thomas Enders, the U.S. Under Secretary of State for Inter-American 
Affairs, what the “American attitude” would be if there was increased 
tensions between the British and Argentine governments, Enders replied that 
the United States’ policy would be “hands off!”190  Although Enders disputes 
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this sequence of events, Cardoso reminds the reader that the United States’ 
“hands off” policy was the traditional Washington policy on such matters, 
and, more importantly, “Costa Mendez believed he saw in the message (from 
Enders) a confirmation of American disinterest — a decisive point in the 
Argentine military plans.”191 
Third, Argentina believed that lack of unanimity on the Falklands issues 
within the United Nations Security Council would prevent any international 
agreement with regard to the use of military force in response to Argentine 
aggression.192  The Security Council is composed of five permanent 
members—China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United 
States—and ten non-permanent members elected by the General Assembly 
for two-year terms.193  In April 1981, the ten non-permanent members 
were Guyana, Ireland, Japan, Jordan, Panama, Poland, Spain, Togo, Uganda, 
and Zaire.194  Security Council members are given one vote each, decisions 
require an affirmative vote of at least nine members, and any permanent 
member has the authority to veto an action.195  In the lead up to the Falklands 
invasion, Argentina believed that it could exploit either the anti-colonialism 
sentiment in the Third World or the East-West divide on the Security 
Council to prohibit a strong U.N. response.  According to some scholars, 
“Costa Mendez assured the [Argentine] Cabinet that there would be no 
problems in the [U.N.] and that one could count on the Soviet and Chinese 
veto.”196   
Unfortunately for the junta, their theory was tested soon after the April 2 
invasion, and they were wrong.  On April 3, the U.N. Security Council 
adopted Resolution 502, which stated, inter alia, that the Council was 
“deeply disturbed” by the Argentine invasion, “determin[ed] that there exists 
a breach of the peace” in the Falkland region, and “demande[ed] an 
immediate withdrawal of all Argentine forces from the Falkland Islands 
(Islas Malvinas).”197  Prior to the invasion, Argentine ambassadors to both 
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the Soviet Union and China were engaging with their host governments, 
respectively, to discuss the possibility of using their veto authority in the 
event that the United Kingdom attempted to pass a strongly worded 
resolution in response to the invasion, such as Resolution 502.198  During the 
Security Council’s debate over Resolution 502, Costa Mendez made a “direct 
appeal” to the Soviet Ambassador to the U.N. to veto the proposal.199  During 
their discussions, Costa Mendez obviously seemed desperate and he “cited 
non-alignment, anti-imperialism, Argentine grain sails to Moscow, anything” 
to get Soviet support.200  In the end, neither the Soviets nor the Chinese used 
its veto authority, and instead, both countries abstained from voting on 
Resolution 502.201 
Foreign Minister Costa Mendez’s prediction that he could convince the 
Third World countries to vote against any U.N. action on the basis of anti-
colonialism unity also turned out to be mistaken.  As Professor Freedman 
posits, Third World countries were not Argentina’s “natural allies.”202  In 
fact, Argentina “had not given much support to the anti-colonial campaign of 
others nor shown much sympathy for those issues which mattered most to 
this group,” such as the Israeli-Palestine dispute.203  Argentina’s hope that 
the past support it received with regard to the dispute, especially from its 
Latin American counterparts, would help in these matters also did not come 
to fruition.204  For instance, in 1976, the Organization for American States, 
through the Inter-American Juridical Committee, declared that Argentina had 
an “undeniable right of sovereignty” over the Falkland Islands.205  Yet, 
during the debate at the United Nations, although many South American 
countries recognized Argentina’s sovereignty over the Falklands, they also 
explicitly acknowledged that their preference was for a peaceful resolution to 
this matter.206   
Lastly, Panama and Guyana were the only two governments from South 
America on the Security Council at the time of the vote.207  Panama voted 
against U.N. Resolution 502,208 but Guyana declined to vote against the 
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resolution because it did not want Argentina’s act of aggression to create 
precedent for resolving disputed territory in the region as it possessed land 
that neighboring Venezuela sought to claim.209  As a result, Argentina’s 
strategy to divide the global community to ensure that there would not be a 
consolidated response to its aggression failed, which proved exceptionally 
valuable for Britain.210   
In summary, during the decisionmaking process that led to war, Argentina 
viewed the international system as being fractured, and in some cases 
sympathetic to its cause.211  This misperception caused Argentina to believe 
that it could use force to reclaim the Falklands, and the international 
community would not respond with unanimity, which, in effect, would 
isolate Britain.212  Further, Argentina’s war strategy was bolstered by 
Britain’s previous indications that it was unwilling to use force to reclaim the 
territory.213  As will be examined more thoroughly below, this Argentine 
world view was neither radical nor extreme.  In fact, Argentina received 
weak deterrent signals from both Britain and the international community 
with regard to the Falklands dispute.   
IV.  MULTI-LEVEL DETERRENCE 
Professor Moore has elaborately argued that deterrence is an absolute 
necessity in ensuring that nation-states avoid armed conflict.214  In a similar 
fashion, Carl Von Clausewitz has written: 
Since war is not an act of senseless passion but is controlled by 
its political object, the value of this object must determine the 
sacrifices to be made for it in magnitude and also in duration. 
Once the expenditure of effort exceeds the value of the political 
object, the object must be renounced and peace must follow.215 
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Thus, multi-level deterrence directed at all levels of the decisionmaking 
process exponentially compounds the perceived costs and risks associated 
with war, and it will impact the level of resources a government is willing to 
expend in order to achieve its goal or objective.  Therefore, based on the 
work of Professor Moore, multi-level deterrence can be defined as the 
process of discouraging acts of aggression through the systematic application 
of unique mechanisms, institutions, and means, including: diplomacy, 
potential military action, collective security, third party dispute settlement, 
and individual criminal liability.216  By examining these factors in the 
Falkland Islands War context, one can see that they either were nonexistent 
or applied in a weak or inefficient manner. 
A.  Diplomacy 
Diplomacy, which is considered both an “art” and “process” of 
conducting state-to-state negotiations, is a significant means for ensuring 
conflict avoidance.217  “When done well,” Professor Moore notes, 
“negotiation can not only settle longstanding disputes and promote stable 
expectations but it can also mobilize deterrence and in many ways reduce the 
risk of war. As such, diplomacy is certainly a staple in the struggle against 
war.”218  Respected international relations theorist Hans Morgenthau 
elaborated on this point: 
Of all the factors that make for the power of a nation, the most 
important, however unstable, is the quality of diplomacy . . . . 
The conduct of a nation’s foreign affairs by its diplomats is for 
national power in peace what military strategy and tactics by its 
military leaders are for national power in war.  It is the art of 
bringing the different elements of the national power to bear 
with maximum effect upon those points in the international 
situation that concern the national interest most directly.219 
However, in order to successfully resolve disputes or prevent war, nation-
states must conduct diplomatic negotiations with realistic goals and 
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objectives in mind, and diplomacy without such clarity, not only is 
meaningless, but may, in some circumstances, be counterproductive.  As one 
can see from an examination of British-Argentine diplomacy in the lead-up 
to the Falkland Islands War, diplomacy in itself ended up being a source of 
contention between the two governments, as opposed to a means to help 
deter aggression. 
British and Argentine negotiations over the sovereignty of the Falkland 
Islands gained momentum in 1965, when the United Nations adopted 
Resolution 2065, which mandated that the two countries resolve the 
territorial dispute “without delay” and in a “peaceful” manner.220  At first, 
there was “considerable progress” with regard to the negotiations, which 
culminated in the signing of a “Memorandum of Understanding” in 1968.221  
Accordingly, this agreement provided:  
The Government of the United Kingdom as part of such a final 
settlement will recognise Argentina’s sovereignty over the 
Islands from a date to be agreed. This date will be agreed as 
soon as possible after (i) the two governments have resolved 
the present divergence between them as to the criteria 
according to which the United Kingdom Government shall 
consider whether the interests of the Islanders would be 
secured by the safeguards and guarantees to be offered by the 
Argentine Government, and (ii) the Government of the United 
Kingdom are then satisfied that those interests are so 
secured.222 
However, Britain’s own diplomatic strategy that focused on transferring 
sovereignty of the Falkland Islands to Argentina was not well received 
domestically.  Due to intense lobbying and pressure exerted by the Falklands 
Islands Committee,223 London “chang[ed] its negotiating position,” and 
indicated that the “ ‘wishes of the islanders’ ” was critical to resolving the 
territorial dispute.224  Yet, the Falkland Islands’ population, sometimes 
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referred to as “Kelpers,” were antipathetic to Argentina, which in effect 
precluded Britain from transferring all out sovereignty to the Argentine 
government, as originally planned and negotiated.225   
Due to this setback, the two governments attempted to “change the 
islanders’ view” of Argentina by integrating the Falklands with the 
mainland.226  In 1971, the Communications Agreements were reached 
between Buenos Aires and London that established a wide range of programs 
intended to further this policy, including the most significant: new air and sea 
transportation services between the Falklands and Argentina.227  The 
Communications Agreements of 1971 also included a provision creating a 
travel document that would guarantee the freedom of movement within 
Argentina for the Islanders and serve as the only travel identification 
necessary for Argentineans travelling to the Falklands; reciprocal duties and 
taxes exemptions; an exemption for Islanders to perform any Argentine 
military service requirements; the harmonization of postal and telephone 
rates; and, a provision for designated scholarships for the Islanders to 
Argentine schools.228  However, this diplomatic progress was undermined by 
the British government when, in 1975, it sent an expedition to the Islands to 
determine any undiscovered economic potential.229  The expedition, referred 
to as the Shackleton survey, “provoked a very hostile reaction in 
Argentina,”230 and was followed by a worsening of relations.231 
Discussions between the governments resumed after the Shackleton 
crisis, and it was during that juncture that London attempted to implement 
the “leaseback” arrangement.232  The leaseback policy envisioned passing 
sovereignty of the Islands to Argentina and then leasing them back to the 
Falkland Islanders for a finite period of time.233  However, in 1980, Britain’s 
general population was made aware of Nicholas Ridley’s trip to the 
Falklands to discuss the lease-back proposal with the Islanders, and, in 
response, the British citizenry fiercely confronted this policy.234  As a result 
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of this fiasco, the Islanders “obliged the [British] Government to add their 
representatives to all future delegations discussing the Islands with Argentina 
and to freeze the sovereignty issue, thus channelling all bilateral (now 
trilateral) negotiations into exclusively peripheral matters.”235  As a result, 
the Falkland Islanders had veto power on negotiations over the Falklands.236 
The lease-back failure, in combination with the Falklands Island 
Committee opposition, left British policy “dangerously out of kilter,”237 and 
consequently British diplomacy equated to “talking for the sake of 
talking.”238  In other words, given their lack of negotiating options, the 
British essentially developed a diplomatic strategy in which they attempted 
to avoid “actually finding a solution to the problem and instead sought 
merely to forestall a crisis by keeping the negotiations alive.”239  This series 
of diplomatic failures contributed to convincing the Argentine regime “of the 
impossibility of obtaining sovereignty over the Falklands through 
diplomacy.”240  Thus, the junta approached the next rounds of negotiations in 
1982 with an alternative military solution already being developed.241  
Ultimately, the lack of diplomatic progress and good faith on the part of the 
British helped solidify the junta’s perception that a peaceful resolution to the 
dispute could not be reached under the current circumstances, and actually 
spurred the Argentine invasion. 
B.  Military Deterrence  
According to Professor Moore, effective military deterrence is “perhaps 
the most important single feature of the deterrent context.”242  In order to be 
considered “effective,” Professor Moore notes that this form of deterrence 
must include several key elements, including: the “ability” and “will” of a 
nation-state to respond with military force, an “effective communication” of 
this position to potential aggressive regimes, and regime leaders perceiving 
that other nation-states have the will and ability to use military force in 
response to aggression.243  According to Professors Arquilla and Rasmussen, 
during the ten years leading up to the Falklands War, Argentina’s “military 
strength grew substantially” in terms of relative power, while Britain was in 
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a state of decline, and, thus, by 1982 “the forces dedicated to the fight by 
each side, though not identical, were in virtual equipoise.”244  During this 
period, Argentine defense spending doubled, in contrast to British spending, 
which “remained virtually flat.”245  Additionally, Argentina’s military 
expansion focused on building a capacity to fight armed conflicts in the 
South Atlantic, while Britain prioritized its capabilities in anticipation of a 
potential land war in Europe against the Soviet Union or other Warsaw Pact 
countries.246  Professors Arquilla and Rasmussen note, “[f]rom [a] purely 
quantitative perspective . . . it seems clear that the combatants were closely, 
though not identically, matched.  A more qualitative approach to evaluating 
the correlation of forces does not erode this finding.”247  Although it has been 
noted that Britain possessed nuclear weapons and the junta did not, which is 
clearly an advantage to the former, Arquilla and Rasmussen contend: 
“normative inhibitions against the threat of [the] first use [of their nuclear 
weapons] were no doubt severely constraining, and there is no evidence of 
the junta being intimidated by this extremely unlikely possibility.”248   
Regardless of the United Kingdom’s ability to deter an Argentine 
invasion by the use of armed forces, it consistently failed to demonstrate the 
“will” to defend the Falkland Islands militarily.  Instead, Britain often left the 
Islanders vulnerable to invasion, a fact understood in Buenos Aires and a key 
factor in the junta’s war strategy.249   For instance, in September 1966, the 
New Argentina Movement, a Perόnist group of young Argentine civilians, 
hijacked an airplane and forced it to land in Port Stanley.250  The hijackers 
even “arrested two British officials” during the exploit code-named 
“Operation Condor.”251  The operation was deemed a “farce” as the airplane 
sank in the racecourse it landed on (there were no airport landing strips at the 
time), and the perpetrators were eventually captured and returned to 
Argentine custody.252  Yet, members of Argentina’s general public viewed 
the Perόnists as “national heroes,” and threatened strikes if they were 
prosecuted for their crimes.253  From a military standpoint, Operation Condor 
clearly “demonstrated the islands’ vulnerability to surprise attack from the 
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mainland,”254 and that Argentina could most likely backup its claim to the 
territory through the use of military force.255   
In fact, a 1965 British Joint Intelligence Committee Report actually 
predicted that, although it was unlikely the Argentine government would 
launch an assault on the Islands, an invasion by an “unofficial party of 
raiders” could pressure the Argentine regime to change its posture and 
support the reclamation.256  In response to Operation Condor, the Royal 
Marine detachment in the Islands was restored to platoon strength, after 
having been reduced to one officer and five men a few years earlier.257  The 
British government was well aware that the stationing of a platoon would not 
be able to prevent or counter a full-scale Argentine invasion.258  Instead, 
London’s strategy was based upon the presumption that the positioning of 
more soldiers on the Islands would increase the possibility of bloodshed 
during an Argentine invasion of the Falklands, and this would result in 
Britain gaining international sympathy for its cause.259  According to at least 
one assessment of these events, “the British response signalled the 
remarkable weakness of British commitment to its claim” over the Islands.260 
In 1975, as diplomatic relations worsened between the two countries, 
military confrontation escalated.  In December 1975, the Argentine Chief of 
the Army warned the British Naval Attaché in Buenos Aires that the crew of 
the RRS Shackleton, an unarmed research ship, would be arrested and 
detained if they entered Argentine waters.261  In February 1976, the British 
vessel found itself approximately seventy-eight miles south of the Falkland 
Islands.262  In response, an Argentine destroyer fired shots across the RRS 
Shackleton’s bow after it refused Argentine orders to stop encroaching on 
Argentine waters.263  According to a British intelligence report, Argentina’s 
plan to intercept the ship had been in existence for about six weeks, was 
developed by the armed forces and not the Argentine civilian government, 
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and was specifically designed to avoid British casualties.264  In response to 
the incident, the British reversed an earlier decision to take its only armed 
vessel from the region, the HMS Endurance, out of service.265  Instead, the 
ship would remain in the South Atlantic, subject to annual or biannual 
review.266   The British government also deployed a frigate and a civilian-
manned Royal Navy support vessel, which represented “the firmest response 
of any British government to an Argentine challenge during this period.”267 
After this incident, the British government completed a military 
assessment that sought to outline options to counter an Argentine invasion of 
the Islands.268  The assessment discussed both the difficulties of providing air 
reinforcements to the Islands, primarily because of the lack of an airstrip, and 
the effects of adverse weather, climate, and the Islands’ geographic isolation 
on military planning.269  The report concluded that “[t]o recover the Islands 
by military means, though far from impossible, would be a major operation 
at very long range.”270  Some scholars contend that this “bleak” assessment 
brought the British government back to the negotiating table despite 
Argentina’s aggressive posture.271 
In yet another incident, on December 20, 1976, Britain “discovered the 
existence of an Argentine military presence on Southern Thule in the South 
Sandwich Islands.”272  On January 5, 1977, Britain requested that Buenos 
Aires explain its presence on the Dependency.273  Nine days later, the 
Argentine Ministry of Foreign Affairs told its British counterparts that the 
work on the island was scientific in nature and implied that its presence 
would not be permanent.274  On January 19, the British delivered a formal 
diplomatic protest, in which the government indicated that prior consultation 
should have been sought, Argentine actions violated British sovereignty, and 
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that the scientific program should be terminated.275  Professor Freedman 
describes the Southern Thule precedent as “enticing” due to the fact that 
Britain had a relatively subdued response, as evidenced by the fact that 
London’s formal protest did not occur until after a month after the discovery 
of Argentina’s presence on the Dependency.276  Other commentators have 
more strongly indicated that the incident, and particularly the British 
response, “communicated a lack of seriousness on both diplomatic and 
military levels.”277  Additionally, following the incident, the British actually 
softened their positions during the dispute negotiations, and again illustrating 
a willingness to discuss transferring sovereignty of the Falklands.278   
Clearly, the Southern Thule incident represents precedent in which 
Argentina aggression, albeit an extremely minor form, was not met with any 
British military force or even an illustration of the will to use force to protect 
its sovereignty over the Falklands.  In fact, a February 7, 1977 British 
intelligence report indicated that, as part of the Southern Thule incident, the 
Argentine government had a contingency plan to invade the Falklands.279  
Ultimately, the plan was “shelved” not because of British military 
deterrence, but rather because the junta could not count on support from the 
communist bloc or Third World countries at that point in time.280 
In June 1981, after an internal defense review on the Falklands situation, 
the British government decided to withdraw the HMS Endurance at the end 
of its 1981–1982 deployment.281  Although the ship was not very well-
equipped militarily, it was the only regular British naval presence in the 
region and had a symbolic value “far beyond its military capabilities.”282  
Indeed, the British Foreign Office warned that such a policy would be 
misconstrued in Argentina, and the junta would interpret such an action as “a 
diminution in Britain’s commitment to the Islands.”283  This sentiment was 
echoed in Buenos Aires as well: 
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In July 1981 the British Embassy in Buenos Aires reported, in 
a letter to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office at official 
level, that several Argentine newspapers had carried 
prominently versions of a report of an article in The Daily 
Telegraph on the subject.  The letter reported that all the 
newspaper articles highlighted the theme that Britain was 
“abandoning the protection of the Falkland Islands”.  An 
intelligence report in September 1981 quoted an Argentine 
diplomatic view that the withdrawal of HMS Endurance had 
been construed by the Argentines as a deliberate political 
gesture; they did not see it as an inevitable economy in 
Britain’s defence budget since the implications for the Islands 
and for Britain’s position in the South Atlantic were 
fundamental.284 
Further solidifying Argentina’s belief that Britain lacked the will to defend 
the Falkland Islands militarily, when the scrap merchants planted the 
Argentine flag on South Georgia Island in March 1982, the incident that 
preceded the full Argentine invasion, there was a “muted British 
response.”285  Although the British did have some military personnel in the 
region, it clearly was not enough to equate to effective military deterrence.286  
In fact, some of the larger and more threatening British naval deployments in 
the South Atlantic, such as nuclear submarines, were placed in the immediate 
area covertly and without the Argentineans ever discovering them.287  Such a 
policy is counterintuitive to military deterrence theory. 
The British government was simply not conveying to the Argentine 
military junta, nor was the latter perceiving, that the British had the will and 
desire to keep the Falkland Islands by military force, if necessary.  The 
Franks Report notes that during the period 1965–1979, “[t]he  military threat 
to the Islands varied in the light of the course of negotiations; it also changed 
character from ‘adventurist’ operations in the Islands to wider and more 
aggressive forms of military action by the Argentine Navy.”288  This brief 
summary of events illustrates that the British government simply did not 
demonstrate a will to use force to protect the Falklands, which contributed to 
an escalation of Argentine aggression. 
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C.  Collective Security and Regional Arrangements 
Generally, collective security refers to any and all multilateral agreements 
that are established to protect the security of nation-states.289  Collective 
security “envisages an institutionalized arrangement for deterring or 
defeating aggression, conceived as the resort to violence in pursuit of change, 
by guaranteeing that an attack by any . . . [nation-state] will be met by the 
combined resistance of all the others whose contribution to the common 
defense may be needed.”290  The concept is rooted in the idea that any change 
in the international system must come about through peaceful means.291  Any 
attempt to use force to amend the status quo poses a threat to the entire 
international system; therefore, nation-states will accept the responsibility of 
defending the order of the current system.292  The collective security theory 
came to prominence during the interwar period, and is illustrated “in the 
preamble of the Covenant of the League of Nations, which obligated all 
nations to solidarity ‘for their peace and security.’ ”293   
Although in its broadest sense collective security contemplates the 
organization of the entire international community to respond to aggression, 
regional organizations play a key role in collective defense and the 
maintenance of international peace and security.  For example, the U.N. 
Charter provides that the U.N. shall not “impair the inherent right of 
individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a 
Member of the United Nations.”294  Additionally, it does not preclude the 
“existence of regional arrangements or agencies for dealing with . . . the 
maintenance of international peace and security . . . provided that such 
arrangements or agencies and their activities are consistent with the Purposes 
and Principles of the United Nations.”295  The Charter also mandates, “[t]he 
Security Council shall, where appropriate, utilize such regional arrangements 
or agencies for enforcement action under its authority.  But no enforcement 
action shall be taken under regional arrangements or by regional agencies 
without the authorization of the Security Council . . . .”296  The most 
significant collective security and regional security arrangements that the 
United Kingdom was integrated with at the time of the Falkland Islands War 
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were the United Nations and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO).   
The preamble to the U.N. Charter specifically notes that it was 
established “to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war,” in part 
by “unit[ing] our strength to maintain international peace and security.”297  
Thus, one of the international organization’s fundamental purposes is to 
utilize collective security to deter and respond to aggression.  Prior to the 
1982 Falkland Islands War, the United Nations had only employed a 
significant collective security response to an act of aggression on one 
occasion: the Korean War.298  Yet, the Security Council’s call to action 
against North Korean aggression was not born out of unity of purpose and 
resolve; rather, it was accomplished only because the Soviet Union 
mistakenly thought that its abstention from the Council’s voting was the 
equivalent to a veto.299  As scholars have noted, “[T]he record of practice 
seems to be that the new UN rules of collective security were every bit as 
ineffective as those of the League of Nations.”300 
In addition to the United Nation’s internal political differences that 
caused a collective security impasse, the international organization has 
historically lacked effective and efficient armed forces.301  Article 43 of the 
Charter states that the Security Council must rely upon member states to 
“make available” their own national armed forces for collective security 
missions, in accordance with “special agreements.”302  However, to date, no 
country has entered into an Article 43 agreement with the United Nations, 
and thus, the organization does not have its own military force readily 
available to deter or respond to acts of aggression.303  Therefore, although the 
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U.N. provides a process for defining when and how the use of force is 
permitted, it has a very limited ability to effectuate these decisions.304  
Clearly, this lack of readily deployable armed forces undermines the 
deterrence factor that U.N. collective security is supposed to portray: any act 
of aggression by one state will be met with the combined resistance of all 
other member-states. 
The historic Cold War division on the Security Council, which resulted in 
a United Nations collective security stalemate, as well as its lack of 
institutional military capability, was not lost on the Argentine government.  
In fact, as demonstrated above, during the war planning, the junta relied on a 
veto from the Soviet Union, China, or the nonaligned countries on the 
Security Council to reject a United Kingdom-proposed resolution 
condemning the invasion.305  Additionally, given Argentina’s growing 
relationship with Washington, the military junta believed that the former 
would not permit a military response by London in the Western Hemisphere, 
but instead would seek a peaceful resolution to the matter.306  Therefore, 
whether because of a polarized Security Council, a nonexistent military 
structure, or poor leadership, the United Nations collective security ability 
did not have a significant effect on the Argentine government 
decisionmaking prior to the Falklands War.   
In contrast to the United Nations, NATO is typically seen as an effective 
and well-organized collective security body.307  The North Atlantic Treaty 
(also known as the Washington Treaty) was signed in 1949, and it officially 
created the transatlantic military alliance known as NATO.308  Originally, 
twelve countries signed the treaty as a mechanism to confront the growing 
threat of communist expansionism in Europe and maintain international 
peace through united military deterrence.309  According to the NATO 
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Handbook, “[NATO] commits each member country to sharing the risks and 
responsibilities as well as the benefits of collective security . . . . Solidarity 
and cohesion within the Alliance ensure that no member country is forced to 
rely upon its own national efforts alone in dealing with basic security 
challenges.”310  This underlying concept of collective security is articulated 
in Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, which provides in part: 
The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of 
them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack 
against them all, and consequently they agree that, if such an 
armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of 
individual or collective self-defence recognized by Article 51 
of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or 
Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in 
concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems 
necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and 
maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.311 
NATO has been an effective deterrent against nation-state aggression 
primarily because of two interrelated political and military reasons.312  First, 
at the political level, Article 5 clearly represents the broad-based will of 
NATO members to support an ally that has been a victim of aggression by 
providing immediate defense and security.313  Second, since NATO was 
composed of militarily advanced states, it unmistakably had the resources 
and capability to respond successfully to an armed attack.314  However, 
because of its self-imposed military response limitations, its other global 
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priorities, and, again, poor leadership, NATO did not position itself prior to 
the Falklands War to significantly deter or impact Argentina’s military 
strategy. 
First and foremost, Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty mandates a 
collective security response against an “armed attack” only if said attack 
occurs “against one or more of them in Europe or North America.”315  
Therefore, NATO members that are attacked in territory outside Europe or 
North America cannot automatically invoke Article 5 to respond to or 
counter such aggression.316  This is precisely what occurred in the Falkland 
Islands War.  Although Argentina clearly waged a war of aggression against 
British territory, it did so in the South Atlantic Ocean, a far distance from 
Europe and North America.  Thus, if any NATO member state was going to 
assist the United Kingdom in responding to the invasion, it would be doing 
so on a voluntary basis, as opposed to upholding a legally binding treaty 
obligation.  Given Argentina’s preconceived notion that the United Kingdom 
lacked the will to unilaterally respond to a Falklands invasion with armed 
force, one can presume that Argentina most likely thought that the United 
Kingdom would not be able to rally other NATO members to exert armed 
force in response to its aggression. 
Additionally, given NATO’s other, more significant regional security 
interests, the military junta may not have thought that the international 
organization would readily assist the United Kingdom in responding to 
aggression.  However, this was not the case.  One scholar summarizes 
Britain’s interaction with NATO as follows: 
At NATO, the need was to convince Britain’s partners that the 
detachment of a substantial force to sail to the South Atlantic, 
with the inevitable weakening of NATO’s defenses in Europe, 
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was nevertheless an essential reaction to aggression.  The 
argument was accepted early on, and despite some private 
alarm as the size of the task force grew, NATO never wavered 
publically in its backing for the British militarily.  There was 
another, more cynical, reason for this enthusiasm: The South 
Atlantic was to prove the best testing ground ever devised for 
the ships, planes, and missiles on which NATO forces rely.317 
Therefore, although NATO was more than willing to militarily support an 
ally in its response to an act of aggression outside its territorial jurisdiction, it 
did not adequately demonstrate this commitment to deterrence prior to the 
invasion. 
Lastly, as noted above, the United States portrayed itself as neutral with 
regard to the Falklands dispute.  Clearly, the U.S. government, which was a 
key NATO member, did not adequately demonstrate its willingness to invoke 
a collective military response in order to deter Argentine aggression.  In 
reality, however, the fact that Britain was a NATO ally was a deciding factor 
in shifting U.S. support to the British government.  For example, Lawrence 
Eagleburger, who was United States Under Secretary for European Affairs 
during the Falklands War, attempted to influence the Reagan Administration 
to support Britain for the sole reason that it was a member of NATO.  
According to Eagleburger, 
I was driven essentially by one very simple argument — an ally 
is an ally.  I believed . . . that one of our serious general foreign 
policy problems is a growing perception — correct perception 
— that we are no longer reliable partners and allies as we were, 
[and] under those circumstance, in a case that was so important 
to Mrs. Thatcher . . . we had no choice.318 
As Professor Freedman notes, “Although [NATO] itself did not oblige the 
U.S. to come to British aid the circumstances of the Argentine occupation 
and the fact that Britain was the ally in question made support even more 
vital.”319  In order for collective security to maximize its deterrence effect, it 
needs to demonstrate the will and capability to use force in response to 
aggression prior to the act, which clearly did not occur under these 
circumstances. 
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D.  The International Court of Justice 
Professor Moore notes the importance that third-party dispute resolution 
organizations may have with regard to international conflict:  
Certainly mechanisms for encouraging peaceful settlement of 
disputes and resolution of disputes by law rather than force are 
worthy additions to our arsenal against war.  In the long run, 
establishment of stable expectations about authority in the 
international system and encouragement of a genuine rule of 
law among nations is in the interest of all.320 
Although Professor Moore does not speak to it directly, the International 
Court of Justice (ICJ) is one such body.  The ICJ was established, in part, to 
be the “principal judicial organ” of the United Nations,321 and, more 
generally speaking, its “creation . . . represent[s] the culmination of a long 
development of methods for the pacific settlement of international 
disputes.”322  The Court has jurisdiction to settle disputes submitted to it by 
nations, and to render advisory opinions at the request of the United Nations 
or any specialized agencies the U.N. creates.323   
Professor Malcolm Shaw has a similar view, stating that “[t]he [ICJ] does 
not constitute an exclusive, self-contained world, but exists as part of a wide-
ranging set of mechanisms and means for the resolution of inter-state 
disputes.”324  Unfortunately, with regard to the competing claims of 
sovereignty over the Falkland Islands, the ICJ did not manage or help resolve 
the underlying dispute, and was substantially underutilized. 
In 1947, following a rise of tensions between London and Buenos Aires 
on the issue of the Falklands, the former proposed that the territorial dispute 
over the Falkland Island Dependencies, and only the Dependencies, be 
submitted to the ICJ for resolution.325  Argentina rejected this proposal.326  In 
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1955 the British government again approached the ICJ in the hopes that it 
would provide guidance with regard to several disputed territories in the 
South Atlantic region, including islands that the government of Chile 
claimed as its own.327  Yet, again Britain’s application to the ICJ 
distinguished the claims of sovereignty between the Falklands’ 
Dependencies, and the Falklands themselves, and reiterated that sovereignty 
over the former was not derived from title to the latter.328  Britain also noted 
to the ICJ that “there was no ‘sector’ principle in operation, that is southerly 
extension of sovereignty of the Falklands to the Dependencies or from one 
dependency to another.”329  By framing its argument in this manner, Britain 
sought to ensure that any loss or concession of one territory would not affect 
its sovereignty claims to any of the other islands.330  The ICJ ultimately did 
not address the matter primarily because neither Argentina nor Chile would 
consent to ICJ jurisdiction.331  Although the issue of referring the matter to 
the ICJ garnered some attention again in 1966–1967 and 1981–1982, 
respectively, it never came to fruition.332  
Professor Freedman noted that the composition of the court was a factor 
that both countries considered when deliberating on whether or not to submit 
the Falklands dispute to the ICJ.333  During the lead up to the war, the ICJ 
had a unique composition of First, Second, and Third World countries that 
clearly had different perspectives with regard to how nation-states could 
legally acquire territory.334  In addition to its own member on the court, 
Argentina could have relied on members from Algeria, Brazil, India, the 
Soviet Union, Syria, and probably Poland to vote in its favor on the 
dispute.335  On the other hand, Great Britain could have relied upon, in 
addition to its own sitting judge, the support of judges from France, Italy, the 
United States, West Germany, and “probably” Japan.336  It was unclear how 
the judges from Nigeria and Senegal would rule on the matter.337  Therefore, 
although on this count Argentina could have expected a slight advantage 
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with regard to the make-up of the Court, the final decision was still “too 
close to call.”338  Professor Freedman describes how this uncertainty 
reinforced Argentina’s decisionmaking in the lead-up to the Falkland Islands 
War: “While there might be political grounds on which to raise the issue, as 
part of some package deal, there could be no guarantee that a reference to the 
ICJ would ‘be certain, or even more likely than not, to uphold our case.’ ”339  
Thus, Argentina did not permit this course of action to be pursued as a 
realistic alternative to armed conflict. 
Although there was no certainty that Britain would see a favorable 
outcome if the entire Falklands Island dispute (as opposed to just the 
Dependencies) was submitted to the ICJ, such action could have in itself 
benefited London, and assisted in the avoidance of war.  For example, if the 
British government submitted the dispute to the ICJ, and Argentina again 
rejected this proposal (which was the most likely scenario), one could 
presume that Britain would have “gained moral support” from the 
international community.340  In contrast, Buenos Aires’s standing around the 
world may have been tarnished if it again rejected this dispute settlement 
option.  Further, as noted above, the junta was relying on international 
opinion to either be in its favor, apathetic, or, at the very least not 
sympathetic to Britain’s cause after the Falklands invasion.  Thus, in 1982, 
Argentina may have viewed its rejection of ICJ jurisdiction as 
counterproductive to its overall goal of acquiring the Falklands.  In another 
view, if Argentina did accept ICJ jurisdiction over the matter, it would have 
at least frozen the status quo for a “considerable period” of time until a final 
ruling was announced.341  Of course, a ruling in favor of Argentina could 
have, at a minimum, given the British government an opportunity to confront 
the Falkland Islands Committee with the proposition that it had to transfer 
sovereignty of the Islands to Argentina in accordance with the rule of law.  It 
is unclear how Argentina would accept an ICJ ruling in favor of Britain, 
although Professor Freedman notes that based on its experience with regard 
to international arbitration on disputed territory with Chile, Argentina 
“would only accept a judgment in its favour.”342 
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E.  Individual Criminal Liability 
Holding individual regime leaders accountable for the crime of 
aggression can be, if properly implemented, a significant deterrent in 
preventing armed conflict and other human rights atrocities.  At the 
Nuremberg Tribunals, Justice Robert Jackson emphasized, “[t]he wrongs 
which we seek to condemn and punish have been so calculated, so malignant 
and so devastating, that civilization cannot tolerate their being ignored 
because it cannot survive their being repeated.”343  Similarly, Professor 
Benjamin B. Ferencz, a former Nuremberg Tribunal prosecutor, argued, “[a] 
permanent court is needed for permanent deterrence . . . .  The certainty of 
punishment can be a powerful deterrent.  To condemn crime yet provide no 
institution able to convict the guilty is to mock the victims and encourage 
dangerous unrest.”344   
After World War II, the international community expanded upon 
Nuremberg’s principles, as well as earlier efforts that had culminated in the 
Kellogg-Briand Pact,345 and through the U.N. Charter, outlawed the right of 
nation-states to wage wars of aggression.346  More recently, the theory of 
holding individuals accountable for wars of aggression has been codified in 
the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC).347  The ICC was 
adopted in 1998 to “put an end to impunity for the perpetrators” of the most 
serious crimes and thus “contribute to the prevention of such crimes” in the 
future.348  However, the Rome Statute itself did not define the term 
“aggression.”  Rather, the treaty indicated that the ICC will exercise 
jurisdiction over acts of aggression after it has adopted a provision defining 
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the crime and setting forth conditions for the exercise of jurisdiction over the 
crime.349  
In 2010, the Review Conference of the Rome Statute adopted a resolution 
amending the Rome Statute to include a definition of the crime of 
aggression, although the ICC’s exercise of jurisdiction is subject to the 
approval of two-thirds of States Parties in a decision to be taken after January 
1, 2017.350  The Review Conference based its definition of the crime of 
aggression on United Nations General Assembly Resolution 3314, which 
was intended to guide the Security Council in making a determination 
whether there was an “act of aggression” as proffered under Article 39 of the 
U.N. Charter.351  Article I of the Annex to Resolution 3314 defined 
“aggression” as “the use of armed force by a State against the sovereignty, 
territorial integrity or political independence of another State, or in any other 
manner inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations, as set out in this 
Definition,”352 and Article III provided specific actions that “qualify as an act 
of aggression.”353  It was in this context in which the Review Conference 
defined the crime of aggression as  
the planning, preparation, initiation or execution, by a person in 
a position effectively to exercise control over or to direct the 
political or military action of a State, of an act of aggression 
which, by its character, gravity and scale, constitutes a manifest 
violation of the Charter of the United Nations.354 
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It is difficult to speculate whether an international criminal tribunal, such 
as the ICC, would have actually deterred the military junta from waging a 
war of aggression because of fear of personal liability.  It must be noted that 
Resolution 502 did not state that Argentina committed an “act of aggression” 
by invading the Falklands, despite the fact that its actions clearly violated the 
prohibitions articulated in Resolution 3314, the “Definition of 
Aggression.”355  Instead, Resolution 502 simply indicated that the Argentine 
invasion caused “a breach of the peace” in the Falklands region.356  This is 
not surprising, however, as the Security Council has never indicated that any 
nation-state has ever committed an “act of aggression,” but instead has 
chosen to frame conflict, and the right of self-defense, in terms of there being 
a “breach of peace.”357 
Additionally, although there was no permanent international criminal 
tribunal at the time, the junta conducted hostilities in a manner consistent 
with the international laws of war.  For instance, during the initial invasion, a 
significant part of the Argentine strategy was to ensure that there would be 
                                                                                                                   
declaration of war, shall, in accordance with United Nations General 
Assembly resolution 3314 (XXIX) of 14 December 1974, qualify as an act of 
aggression: 
(a) The invasion or attack by the armed forces of a State of the territory of 
another State, or any military occupation, however temporary, resulting from 
such invasion or attack, or any annexation by the use of force of the territory 
of another State or part thereof; 
(b) Bombardment by the armed forces of a State against the territory of 
another State or the use of any weapons by a State against the territory of 
another State;  
(c) The blockade of the ports or coasts of a State by the armed forces of 
another State; 
(d) An attack by the armed forces of a State on the land, sea or air forces, or 
marine and air fleets of another State; 
(e) The use of armed forces of one State which are within the territory of 
another State with the agreement of the receiving State, in contravention of 
the conditions provided for in the agreement or any extension of their 
presence in such territory beyond the termination of the agreement; 
(f) The action of a State in allowing its territory, which it has placed at the 
disposal of another State, to be used by that other State for perpetrating an act 
of aggression against a third State; 
(g) The sending by or on behalf of a State of armed bands, groups, irregulars 
or mercenaries, which carry out acts of armed force against another State of 
such gravity as to amount to the acts listed above, or its substantial 
involvement therein. 
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no “bloodshed.”358  Further, as Professor Freedman notes, during the armed 
conflict itself, “[c]are was taken when it came to the treatment of civilians 
and prisoners and only in the later stages did noncombatants get caught in the 
fighting.”359  However, Argentina’s regime elites may have attempted to 
avoid war crimes, not out of fear of being held individually liable by an ad 
hoc international tribunal created after the war, like the Nuremberg court, but 
out of concern such actions would undermine the junta’s attempt to gain 
international sympathy for its cause.  More to the point, the junta committed 
terrible atrocities and acts against its own people during the “dirty war,” yet 
the Argentine leadership did not seem to fear prosecution for these crimes.  
Given the fact that there simply was no ICC during the 1982 War, it is hard 
to speculate how the junta, which had committed devastating crimes against 
its own people, but not against British soldiers, would have been impacted by 
such an organization. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
By examining the complexity of the decisionmaking process in 
conjunction with the 1982 Falkland Islands War, one can draw several 
lessons as it relates to the significance of multi-level deterrence in avoiding 
armed conflict.  First and foremost, in order to determine what policies 
should be employed to deter an act of aggression, it is important to 
understand the decisionmaking process.  The disposition of regimes elites, a 
government’s structure and organization, and the international system in 
general, will impact the decision associated with using armed forces.  
Therefore, multi-level deterrence must be tailored at all levels of the 
decisionmaking process to compound its effectiveness. 
Often, diplomacy is the first and last mechanism employed to avoid 
armed conflict.  As noted above, in the Falklands case, there was essentially 
seventeen years of negotiations between Argentina and Great Britain prior to 
the conflict.  However, British diplomacy in this era failed miserably.  The 
British government did not use diplomacy as a means to resolve the dispute, 
and deter the use of force.  Instead, diplomats used negotiations as stalling 
tactics.  If Great Britain truly wanted to find a political settlement to the 
dispute, it first needed to confront two entities: its domestic opposition in the 
Falkland Islands Committee, and the Islanders themselves, whose 
overlapping interests and lobbying efforts stymied Britain’s Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office.  London’s oscillating diplomatic strategy of 
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providing concessions to Buenos Aires, which were either contingent on 
improbable thresholds, such as the Falkland Islanders’ consent, or abandoned 
all together, actually spurred the junta to believe that the dispute could only 
be settled after military action was taken.  Ultimately, it was London’s 
ambiguous political strategy towards the Falkland Islands, and its poor 
leadership in this realm, that undermined a central purpose of diplomacy—
deterrence on the use of force and the peaceful settlements of disputes.   
If Great Britain was unwilling to confront its domestic opposition to the 
peaceful transfer of sovereignty, it needed to show a level of military 
deterrence to preempt Argentine aggression.  Unfortunately, London did just 
the opposite: it failed to demonstrate a will to resolve the territorial dispute 
diplomatically, and refused to accept responsibility for the security of the 
Falklands.360  In 1982, British armed forces were created, trained, and 
mobilized primarily in anticipation of a military confrontation in Europe 
against its Cold War enemies.  London did not demonstrate to Buenos 
Aires—in a systematic and calculated fashion—its capability of winning a 
war in the Falklands, or even the priority to do so.  Thus, regardless of 
whether Great Britain had the “ability” to defeat Argentina with military 
force, it repeatedly failed to demonstrate the “will” to do so, a key aspect of 
military deterrence.  The period leading up to the Falkland Islands War 
witnessed a series of both official or unofficial Argentine acts of aggression 
in the South Atlantic.  However, the British government failed to respond to 
any of these events with a seriously tough and overt military stance.  In fact, 
not only did London fail to respond to these acts of aggression with enhanced 
levels of military force to deter further acts of aggression, it often responded 
to these incidents by resuming negotiations or further diminishing its already 
scarce military capability in the region. 
Argentina was also undeterred by the poor implementation of the 
collective and regional security arrangements established at the time.  As 
history has proven, the United Nations lacks the means to enforce a Security 
Council resolution at any given time.  Of course, the Cold War division 
within the United Nations has contributed to its lackluster deterrence 
capability.   NATO’s own geographical limitations, as well as its competing 
priorities, has limited its effectiveness, at least to a certain degree.  In order 
to avoid future acts of aggression, collective and regional security 
arrangements need to demonstrate a cohesive will to respond to acts of 
aggression, wherever they occur.  Acts of aggression should not be tolerated 
simply because they occur outside an area or region of interest to the world 
powers.  Aggression must be confronted immediately in order to deter 
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further or similar acts by other governments.  The United Nations needs to 
develop more unity in confronting aggression, and, just as important, a clear 
capability to do so.  Ideological and political divides on the Security Council 
should no longer permit acts of aggression from going unpunished.  Further, 
the Security Council should not hesitate in labeling an illegal military 
confrontation as an unlawful act of aggression, rather than simply a breach of 
the peace.  By doing so, the Council will be sending a clear message that it 
will respect the tenants of General Assembly Resolution 3314. 
The ICJ and ICC represent two significant, but underutilized, 
international organizations that can help deter aggression.  With regard to the 
former, as demonstrated in the Falklands dispute, many nation-states will 
simply refuse to submit a claim to the ICJ unless they know for certain 
beforehand that they will win the case.  Thus, governments will often seek to 
“count” votes on who they can rely on for support in the ICJ, thus making a 
calculated political decision.  Governments must be persuaded to accept the 
ICJ as a respected international body that will solve disputes peacefully.  
Regarding the latter, the ICC needs to ensure that the implementation of the 
definition for an act of aggression is followed by immediate acceptance of 
jurisdiction of the crime, followed by legitimate prosecution.  The ICC must 
show a willingness to prosecute the crime of aggression just as it has done 
with cases involving genocide and other human rights violations.  By 
employing a multi-level deterrence policy against regime leaders and 
governments prone to aggression, nation-states and the international 
community in general will be in a better position to avoid unlawful armed 
conflict. 
